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Abstract 
 Healthcare industry has evolved dramatically over the time. From being a “cottage 
industry” to an “organized industry” has brought lot of changes. The changes have been both 
good and bad. Among the problems that have surfaced in past couple of decades, rising 
healthcare cost has been one of the most significant. The rising healthcare cost has been 
documented to be a symptom of several factors. Since the inception of healthcare as an organized 
industry several payment models for providers and hospitals have been adopted. Current 
healthcare reforms have proposed new payments models to curb the rising cost and provide 
consumer oriented healthcare.  
 The proposed payment models such as, bundled, capitation, PROMETHEUS, pay-for- 
performance and traditional model of fee-for-service, all have their merits and demerits. Some 
are good for chronic and others for acute conditions, some provide bonuses to physicians for 
high quality and efficient care where as others pay more for number of services used. Our 
literature review has highlighted the lack of systemic study to analyze the effect of payment 
models on reimbursement of physicians and hospitals. This study shows that no “single model” 
can be implemented to serve all the stakeholders. The proposed optimization model is a strategic 
tool that aligns dynamic patient population with existing reimbursement models and provides 
information to providers to help them design favorable contracts with insurers. The model also 
has a potential to help improve planning and operational activities of hospitals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION & PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1 Background 
Introduction of Balanced Budget Act (1997), PL 105-33) brought lot of changes in 
hospitals in the U.S. The system that was introduced in 1983 promised to bring new ways in 
which hospitals would get reimbursed. Some of it involved an experimental payment program 
that waived small rural hospitals from prospective payment system and provided others with 
incentives for providing treatment to uninsured and those under Medicare. The payment was 
based on the system of Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) wherein patients with similar 
conditions are grouped under one group.    
Over the last 2 decades the deregulation of hospital pricing and the rise of managed care 
have led to competition among the stake holders and between the stake holders. Hospitals and 
insurers negotiate for contracts and these contracts vary significantly across insurers (Alan T. 
Sorensen, 2001).With the adoption of Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983-1984, there 
have been several evidences to show the insurance companies gaining more in terms of price 
discounts from the hospitals than vice versa (McNamee, 1995; Loomis, 1994; Phelps, 1992). 
“As of July 2010, the United States spent $2.6 trillion per year on healthcare” (Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, 2012) which was $2.3 trillion in 2009 (Truffer et. al.,. 2010). The rate of growth of 
spending has been increasing at 2.1% more per year than the growth in Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP) for last 30 years. So in last three decades, the percent GDP attributable to healthcare has 
doubled. If major policy changes are not made, experts predict that this spending will continue to 
grow. The projections are that by 2040 33.3% of GDP will be spent on healthcare and by 2080 it 
will increase to 50% (Ezekiel J. Emanuel, 2012).  
The growth seems to be partly because of increased Medicaid spending and increase in 
Medicare payments for providers. Pricewatercooper in its 2002 report concludes that medical 
advances and consumer demand, government mandate and regulations, and litigation and risk 
management are the key factors responsible for increase in healthcare cost. Per capita healthcare 
spending in 2001 grew at 8.7 percent to $5035. According to Levit et. al., (2003), the public 
funding was more than private funding by 1.2 percentage points in the same year. During the 
year 2001 hospital spending increased 8.3 percent accounting for 30 percent of the increase in 
total healthcare spending.  
Major contributors for increase in hospital spending were growth in population, price and 
also per capita increase in quantity of services consumed (Levit et. al., 2003). Further analysis 
showed that population growth contributed only 0.9 percent, whereas quantities of services used 
per capita increased by 4.2 percent up from 2.2 percent in 2000, which was the single major 
contributor of increased hospital spending in 2001, followed by hospital specific inflation rise at 
3.2 percent.   
A large portion of healthcare expenditures that includes an increase in per capita 
utilization of hospital services, are spent on waste and defective care (Schoen et. al., 2006), 
which includes medical errors, and avoidable hospitalizations that cause patients to incur 
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unnecessary services. As per recent report from the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) the cost of potentially preventable hospitalizations in 2006 was $30.8 billion. 
According to Jiang et. al., (2006), 20% of Medicare admissions were due to preventable patient 
conditions. In another study Jencks et. al., (2009) found that “almost 19.6 % of Medicare patients 
incurred re-hospitalization with 30 days of their discharge”.  
According to Weissman et. al., (1992) and Billings et. al., (1993) panels that compared 
administrative records with full hospital charts and clinical experience have defined sets of 
preventable admissions. A group of researchers from UCSF (University of California - San 
Francisco)-Stanford Evidence Based Practice Center (2002) used scientific literature and 
validation method to arrive at narrow set of hospital admissions with Prevention Quality 
Indicator (PQI) conditions that include conditions such as asthma, bacterial pneumonia, 
hypertension etc. According to de Brantes François et. al., (2010), “as much as 22% of the 
healthcare expenditure is related to potentially avoidable complications such as hospital 
admissions for patients with diabetes, ketoacidosis, amputation of gangrenous limbs, congestive 
heart failure. Reducing avoidable complications by 10% could save $40 billion per year”.    
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have started addressing these 
issues by removing payment adjustments that previously compensated hospitals for certain 
hospital-acquired conditions (ECRI Institute 2008). Following their footsteps, private insurers 
have adopted approach in the form of different reimbursement models to remove financial 
incentives to practices that essentially lead to complications. This places accountability on all 
stakeholders in the healthcare system.  
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 The three stake holders in the healthcare system are healthcare insurers, healthcare 
providers (hospitals, physicians etc.) and the patients. The interaction between the three is 
governed by a contract. Contract means there is an agreement wherein healthcare provider 
promises to deliver the service to the set of people being covered and in turn is reimbursed by the 
insurer according to agree upon conditions. Medicare and Medicaid are federal programs which 
pay for the services provided to elderly, disabled, and low-income patients respectively. Services 
to rest of the population are provided based on their coverage through private insurers. 
According to the Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, almost 81 percent of the 
revenue generated by provider is through CMS.     
 Since the introduction of Balanced Budget Act, the system where hospital and insurer 
negotiate payment has become operationally competitive mechanism. Prior to this hospitals 
would set their own prices and insurer would pay full payment for services. This model did not 
require any kind of competition among third party insurers. Over the last 2 decades the 
deregulation of hospital pricing and the rise of managed care have led to competition among the 
stake holders and between these entities. There is a wide level of variation in the contracts 
negotiated between service providers and insurers (Alan T. Sorensen, 2001).       
 According to Laffont and Martimort (2001), principle-agent framework is the model that 
is usually followed to design the healthcare payment systems. The interactions between the 
insurer and provider are where an insurer (a principle) provides instructions and guidelines for 
providing patients’ medical services to a provider (an agent). It is the insurer’s responsibility to 
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formulate a contract that incentivizes patient’s prospective health. These incentives provide the 
motivation towards best practices applied towards well-being of patient.  
  In the United States people are either insured by private commercial insurers or their 
government counterparts like Medicare and Medicaid or are uninsured. The coverage is taken 
either directly or indirectly and is generally bought through a sponsor. Sponsors in turn write 
different contracts with healthcare insurers wherein they can either buy partial or full coverage as 
prescribed in their coverage plan. Healthcare insurers in turn write different contract(s), 
essentially buying services of healthcare providers and pay them as per the design of the contract 
(Born et. al.,, 2004) as explained in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Design of healthcare contract (Source: Contract Optimization at Texas 
Children’s Hospital. Interfaces, 2004) 
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 Insurer writes a specific contract with each provider in the network who is generally paid 
based on per unit of care which could be either per DRG or per inpatient day. The contracts are 
provider specific and negotiated annually. This also varies across insurers for given providers 
(Ho, 2009).   
 The selective nature of contracts is intended to control costs and insurers prefer to 
contract with hospitals that provide quality care to patients. The drawback of managed care 
system which started with the enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, is 
that the selective nature of contracts also give power to insurers to exclude providers from their 
network thus negotiating for lower provider price (Brooks et. al.,, 1997).   
 “It is known that healthcare providers have some say for the rates provided by Medicare 
and Medicaid. There is not much in literature about the bargaining process that goes on between 
the provider and insurer. According to Ho (2009), there are several stages in the process to 
design a contract between insurer and a provider”:  
 Stage 1: Hospital makes price offer to contracts. 
 Stage 2: Contracts choose their hospital networks. 
 Stage 3: Contracts set premiums. 
 Stage 4: Consumers and employers jointly choose contracts. 
 Stage 5: Stick consumers visit hospitals; contracts pay per service provided.  
 After conducting several interviews with insurers and providers, Ho concluded that 
providers with high patient satisfaction rate are in a position to demand higher rate of 
reimbursement. Provider seeks to increase revenue and therefore tend to contract with insurers 
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offering better prices and preferred patients. Despite all the posturing by providers, the leverage 
is generally skewed towards insurers.  
 There are several reimbursement plans/models proposed. Some of them have been in use 
for a long time but never got prominence and others have been proposed recently after recent 
changes in healthcare policy. The common focus in all the models is quality, and/or efficiency of 
care provided to the patients in the process of care (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2008). 
According to the report, making healthcare more efficient would be in terms of rate of utilization 
of services, such as, radiology, utilization of emergency department; overall expenditures, or 
medical errors.  
This paradigm shift in healthcare policy has radically affected the modes by which stake 
holders involved in healthcare get benefited, such as hospitals, physicians, patients etc. Different 
reimbursement models solve the cost Vs. quality differently. As can be seen in Figure 1.2 there is 
no standard or one particular solution to the situation.  
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Figure 1.2: Cost Vs quality and reimbursement models (Source: Which Healthcare 
Payment System is Best?, CHQPR) 
 
1.2 Reimbursement Models  
1.2.1 Fee-For-Service 
Fee for service as the name suggests means insurer pays for services rendered by the 
provider based on Clinical Practice Guideline (CPG). The price of the services is established by 
negotiation between insurer and provider. Charges for all the services that a provider provides 
are generally listed on their fee schedule, which is based on set of 5 digit codes called Current 
Procedural Terminology (CPT). 
In an ideal world it could be a good model for reimbursing providers, 
however for the most part it is the insurer who makes a decision of how much each service 
should be paid and hence the provider feels underpaid. On the other hand there is equally high 
likelihood of over utilization of services and the model is more prone to be volume driven than 
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value driven. Although this model has weaknesses, it is still the most common methods of 
reimbursing providers. 
1.2.2 PROMETHEUS 
PROMETHEUS which stands for Provider Payment Reform for Outcomes Margins 
Evidence Transparency Hassle-reduction Excellence Understandability and Sustainability was 
result of a joint effort of a team composed of insurers and providers (Massachusetts Medical 
Society, 2008). This model is a modification for fee-for-service payment model. The physicians 
are paid for fee for service, but also receive high bonuses for providing uncomplicated and 
efficient care to the patients (described in detail in chapter 2).  
The model is arguably the most advanced payment reimbursement model currently 
available. The model is based on Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs). CPGs include guidelines 
for the process and resources required to treat a specific condition (Massachusetts Medical 
Society, 2008).   
1.2.3 Bundled Payment 
This is also called as “episode of care” or “case rate” payment. This means a single 
bundled payment made for a specific condition such as knee replacement or kidney transplant 
etc. The episode could include different specialists, different facilities, post-operative care etc. 
involved in an “episode”. The payment is typically made to the hospitals, which divide it among 
providers involved in the care. In case the total cost of care is less than the bundled payment, the 
profit is shared among all. Similarly loss is shared among all in case the cost exceeds the bundled 
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payment. This kind of model is appropriate for acute cases such as heart attack, the conditions 
that have clear beginning and an end (Congressional Budget Office, 2008). In such a condition, 
under this model a single payment would be made to the provider.   
Although this model has drawbacks, the model works better than global payment 
model in certain cases, such as, acute conditions or different acute episodes of chronic 
conditions. The difference between “episode of care” or bundled payment model is that risk is 
shared by both insurers and physicians (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2008).   
According to a report, The Medicare bundled payments for care improvement initiative: 
An analysis and its implications to potential participants (2011), there are four different types of 
bundled payment models based on whether the patient is being treated for an acute or chronic 
condition. They are – 
Model 1: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Care. This payment model involves 
only acute-care inpatient hospitalization. The episode of care begins with patient’s 
hospitalization and ends with his/her discharge.  
Model 2: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Plus post-Acute Care. This model 
includes acute-care hospitalization and post-acute care following and associated with acute-care 
episode. Post-acute care can have two options, with option 1 the episode ends before 90 days of 
and in option 2 the episode ends after 90 days of hospital discharge.   
Model 3: Retrospective Post-Acute Care Only. The payment in this model is limited to 
the episode of only post-acute care following an inpatient hospital stay. It begins with the 
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services provided at skilled nursing home, long-term care hospital etc. 30 days after patient 
discharge.  
Model 4: Prospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Only. This model is like Model 1 
wherein, the episode of care starts with patient’s hospitalization. And the episode ends upon 
discharge from the acute care hospital and includes all Part A and Part B services provided 
during patient’s stay. 
 Table 1.1 below summarizes the reimbursement models, their method of reimbursement, 
their benefits and concerns.  
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Table 1.1: Summary, benefits and concerns of Bundled and PROMETHEUS payment models 
Model Name Summary Method of payment Benefits Concerns Other Comments 
Bundled 
Payments or 
Episode of care 
or Case rate 
payment 
 
 
Payment covers 
particular episode of 
care, such as myocardial 
infarction or a hip 
replacement 
A bundled payment is 
made to a hospital, 
which divides the 
payment between the 
hospital and all of the 
providers who cared 
for the patient 
Hopefully it will 
give providers a 
great incentive to 
coordinate care, 
thus improving 
outcomes and 
reducing waste and 
unnecessary care 
Physicians worry that 
hospitals will get 
lion's share and those 
not affiliated with 
hospitals or network 
will find it difficult to 
participate 
How to divide the money 
fairly? 
Multiple Providers in 
multiple settings may 
share in the payment for 
a patient's episode of 
care 
Doctors and hospital 
share the differences, 
whether it is profit or 
loss 
 
Very sick patients 
might get shunned as 
they are very 
expensive to be 
treated 
How do you prevent 
providers from being 
biased and cherry 
picking patients with 
good prognosis etc.? 
An episode of care could 
encompass a period of 
hospitalization, 
hospitalization + post-
acute case, or a defined 
time frame of care for a 
chronic condition 
  
Access to specialist 
could be limited and 
defining "episode of 
care" can be difficult 
for certain illnesses 
and chronic 
conditions 
How to define "episode 
of care"? 
PROMETHEU
S Payment 
it rewards physicians for 
practicing efficiently and 
avoiding complications 
Physicians are paid fee 
for service, which is a 
debit against the case 
rate 
Physicians stand to 
receive bonuses for 
high quality, 
efficient care 
without being at 
financial risk 
Physicians need the 
infrastructure to 
make this model 
work 
It's strength is that it 
promotes clinical 
collaboration and 
coordination of care 
across specialties and 
settings of care 
teams negotiate all-
inclusive case rates 
according to evidence-
based guidelines for 
episodes of acute and 
long term care 
Physicians can share a 
withhold if their team 
prevents avoidable 
complications 
It's success depends on 
whether its incentives 
will follow evidence-
based guidelines will 
enough waste to fund 
quality-based bonuses 
for physicians 
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1.3 Problem Statement  
Almost two thirds of Americans have health insurance plan of one form or other 
highlighting the importance of understanding the competitive interaction between insurers and 
providers (Quinn, 1998).  Competition is not only between insurers and providers but also within 
insurers and providers. The research done in the past e.g., Pauly (1987, 1988a, 1988b), Staten et. 
al.,, (1987, 1988) and Melnich et. al.,, (1992), shows there is a significant correlation between 
competition and prices in market. The insurance reimbursement plans play a very important role 
(Burns and Wholey, 1992). Negotiating the terms of reimbursement in contract depends 
significantly on market power helped by the stake holders.  
 “The maximum revenue generated from a hospital’s perspective comes from the contract 
terms established by them with private insurers. The number of contract portfolio maintained by 
the provider or healthcare provider system can range anywhere from 50 up to 200 with different 
revenues. With so much revenue at stake, it becomes important to design a contract in such a 
way that it gets maximized. Reimbursement contract in no ways guarantees the number of 
patients, but the rate of reimbursement for the service provided” (Born, 2004).   
 To improve accountability in the delivery of healthcare, Medicare & Medicaid and 
private insurers have developed several reimbursement plans/models as mentioned above. These 
models are based on “Evidence-informed Case Rates (ECRs) which is a single, risk-adjusted, 
prospective or retrospective, payment given to providers across inpatient and outpatient settings 
to care for a patient diagnosed with a specific condition. Payment amounts are based on the 
resources required to provide care as recommended in well-accepted clinical guidelines” (de 
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Brantes, F., 2007). The common denominator for all the ECRs is the window of time period 
during which any relevant (whether typical or Potentially Avoidable Condition (PAC)) 
readmission of patient will be reimbursed. The window of time period varies with the model of 
reimbursement as shown in Figure 1.3.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: Depiction of number of days covered under each reimbursement model 
 
Designing a contract that maximizes patient’s health outcomes while allowing the other 
two stake holders to optimize their own objective functions depend on several factors including 
reimbursements provided by insurer to the provider. Reimbursement is a complex process that 
involves many factors not only related to patients’ condition but also different cost structures 
providers have.    
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All the reimbursement models, considered in the research, provide a chance for both 
insurers as well as providers to share the savings and thus increasing their revenue by reducing or 
preventing PACs. The purpose of the research is to design an optimization model, using all the 
reimbursement models, to maximize the revenue. The optimization model aligns dynamic patient 
population with existing reimbursement models and provides information to providers to help 
them design not only favorable contracts with insurers but also help improve their planning and 
operational activities. The model will also help in hospitals in strategizing their revenues through 
reimbursements. 
1.4 Research Justification 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), popularly known as Obama 
care or Affordable Care Act (ACA), was signed into law on March 23, 2010. The law aims at 
improving the quality and increasing the affordability of health insurance. The law also aims to 
reduce escalating healthcare costs and improve healthcare outcomes by moving from current 
quantity driven system to more quality driven system. This can be achieved by increasing 
competition, regulation, and incentives to streamline the delivery of healthcare. The changes 
enacted include restructuring of Medicare reimbursement from fee-for-service to bundled 
payment (Wikipedia). Effective October 1, 2012, CMS had begun Readmission Reduction 
Program, which penalizes IPP.S hospitals with excess readmissions.   
The deregulation of prices in hospitals in the last two decades and emergence of managed 
care plans introduced selective contracting into the hospital market. Not all the hospitals get the 
contract and the decision largely depends on services, amenities, quality and price. In a recent 
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article “The future of U.S. healthcare (The Wall Street Journal, Monday, December 12, 2011), 
the author has cited many examples where individual physician practices are shutting down. The 
hospitals are increasingly merging with other hospitals, and they are signing contract with 
employers. Insurance companies on the other hand are trying to acquire hospitals or signing new 
payment terms. In short the lines of distinction between hospitals and insurance companies are 
getting blurred.  
There is a contract between a provider and insurer, whenever an individual gets services 
from a provider, insurer pays provider based on the contract terms. It has become overly 
important for both hospitals and insurance companies to look at their contractual terms for their 
better future. The above discussed models are not free from shortcomings. They all have 
advantages for one and risks for others, as summarized in Table 1.1. This research intends to use 
Industrial Engineering skills and the knowledge of Operations Research to develop an 
optimization model which will help providers design favorable contracts with insurers.  
1.5 Expected Results 
 The model will help providers choose a reimbursement model or the combination of 
models from the mix of available reimbursement models that is best for their dynamic patient 
population and the facility, by: 
a. helping providers in assessing reimbursement based on DRGs, 
b. helping providers choose among different insurers, and  
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c. helping providers in deciding future investment (based of increase in number of 
patients from particular DRG or more profitable DRG, by increasing number of beds etc.) thus 
making them more competitive in market. 
 The rest of the manuscript is organized in several chapters. Chapter 2 deals with an 
extensive literature review with two parts. First part explains the available and proposed 
reimbursement models in healthcare. The section also enlists advantages and disadvantages of 
the models. Second part explains several techniques that have been used for negotiations in other 
industries in detail. The chapter also explain how DEA has been used in healthcare in general but 
has not been used for optimizing reimbursement plans in particular.  
Chapter 3 is about methodology, classical Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and in 
combination with Principal Component Analysis (PCA DEA), used for designing optimization 
model. It explain in detail the formulation of optimization model.  
In chapter 4 results obtained using DEA optimization model will be discussed. The 
chapter will explain advantages and disadvantages of the optimization model also discusses how 
DEA optimization model can help providers negotiate a contract with insurers that allows them 
to maximize their profit by reducing PACs. 
Finally the manuscript will be concluded with suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Section 1 
Inpatient reimbursement is calculated based a system called Acute Care Hospital 
Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). The way IPPS works is explained hereunder, the 
information gathered here is collected from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
2.1 Background 
 A contract is written between a provider and Medicare to set acute IPP.S rates which a 
facility accepts. The contract covers the episode of care beneficiaries for 90 days of care per 
episode with an additional 60 days lifetime reserve. The episode of begins when a beneficiary is 
admitted and it ends when patient has been out of the facility for 60 consecutive days. 
2.1.1 Basis of IPP.S Payment 
 The reimbursement received by the hospital for inpatients is either per case or per 
discharge based. “All the outpatient diagnostic services and admission related non-diagnostic 
services provided by the facility or an entity that is wholly owned or operated by the admitting 
facility on the date of patient’s inpatient admission or within 3 days immediately preceding the 
admission must be included in the IPP.S claim”. 
 For each patient hospital treats it files a claim to the Medicare Administrative Contractor 
(MAC). Based on the information on the claim MAC categorizes each case into Diagnostic 
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Related Group (DRG). DRG is a classification system was developed by Robert Barclay Fetter 
and John D. Thompson at Yale University with the material support of the former Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA), now called the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) (Wikipedia). The DRG is determined with the help of a principal diagnosis and/or up to 
24 comorbidities (secondary diagnosis). It is also affected by up to 25 procedures furnished by 
the facility during the stay of the patient. The CMS reviews the definitions of DRGs annually 
and make required changes.  
 Since October 1, 2007, CMS has started using new DRG system called Medicare 
Severity (MS)-DRG, which takes severity of illness and consumption of resources into 
consideration when assigning the DRG. Assigning the severity is based on secondary diagnosis 
which has 3 levels to it: 
 MCC – Major Complication/ Comorbidity, which reflect the highest level of severity, 
 CC - Complication/ Comorbidity, which is the next level of severity, and 
 Non-CC – Non-Complication/ Comorbidity, which do not significantly affect severity of 
illness and resources used.  
2.1.2 Fee-For-Service Model (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2009) 
 
 Fee-For-Service (FFS) as the name suggests means insurer pays for services rendered by 
the provider based on CPG. The price of the services is established by negotiation between 
insurer and provider. Charges for all the services that a provider provides are generally listed on 
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their fee schedule, which is based on set of 5 digit codes called Current Procedural Terminology 
(CPT). 
 In an ideal world it could be a good model for reimbursing providers, however for the 
most part it is the insurer who makes a decision of how much each service should be paid and 
hence provider feels underpaid. On the other hand there is equally high likelihood of over 
utilization of services and the model is more prone to be volume driven than value driven. 
Although this model has weaknesses, it is still the most common methods of reimbursing 
providers. 
2.1.2.1 How do hospitals get paid under Medicare? 
 
 Medicare Part A Prospective payment system is method by which weight is given to 
DRGs submitted by hospital to CMS for claims submitted for the payment for the services 
provided to the patient. The Flow of information is shown in Figure 2.1 below. Similar method is 
followed by most of the private insurers which also works on DRGs. 
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Hospital/ 
Physician
Medicare/ 
Fiscal Intermediary
CMS
Patient w/ Condition Physician/ Hospital
1' Diagnosis
2' Diagnosis
Complications
Co-morbidities
Medical record
assigns  
Diagnostic & 
Procedure 
Code from ICD
Claim Form
UB-92
Fiscal Intermediary
Medicare Code 
Editor 
(Claim Processing 
System)
Screening of 
cases by 
system
“Grouper”
All the discharge 
cases assigned 1 of 
25 MDCs
Assigning 1 of 499 
DRGs
Medicare provides 
Analysis & Review 
file to CMS
CMS assigns 
“weight”
to DRG
PPS = Prospective Payment System
CMS = Centers for Medicare & 
             Medicaid Services
DRG = Diagnostic Related Group
MDC = Major Diagnostic Categories 
Fiscal Intermediary = Private Company
             contacted by Medicare to process
             bills and pay claims for
             Medicare Part A services
Grouper = an algorithm used by Fiscal 
             Intermediary to group all the
             discharges into one of the MCDs
How Prospective Payment System Works
 
Figure 2.1: Flow of information from Hospital to CMS to claim DRGs 
 
  
There is a complex formula to calculate the payment for hospital using DRGs by CMS, 
described in Figure 2.2 below. DRGs are classified according to the affected organ system, 
surgical procedure performed in patients, morbidity and sex of the patients. The system can 
account for 9 diagnoses per case, 1 primary and up to 8 diagnoses during the stay in the hospital. 
The system can also account for up to 6 procedures. DRGs cover both labor and no-labor costs 
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(bundle services) and routine operating costs, such as, patient care, routine nursing services, 
room and boarding, diagnostics, ancillary services etc.  
 
How Prospective Payment System Works
Calculating DRG weights
- patient charges are standardized to remove effects of the regional area wage differences
- indirect medical education costs
- additional payment to hospitals that treat a large percentage of low income patients (“disproportionate share 
payments”)
- the cases outside 3 standard deviations are eliminated
- disproportionate share payments
- whether the hospital is a sole community hospital, 
  Medicare dependent rural hospital (depends on Medicare for atleast 60% of its patient days or discharges), or            
  a regional referral hospital
                  Average standard charge  = sum of charges of all cases in the DRG
                          # of cases classified in the DRG
                                Weighting factor  = Average charge of each DRG
                                        National average standardized charge per case
                     Hospital Payment = DRG weight x hospital’s payment rate/case (“large urban” or “other”)
    
                    
 Hospital Payment = DRG weight x standardized amount 
where,                    
standardized amount = a “labor component” (representing labor cost variation among different 
parts of the country)
+
   a “non-labor component” (representing geographic calculation based on  
whether the hospital is located in a large urban or other area)
+
if applicable: 
cost outlier + disproportionate share + indirect medical education Payments  
Note: DRG system does not include some specialized hospitals, such as, psychiatric, cancer, long-term care, 
children’s, and rehabilitation hospitals
Figure 2.2: Calculating Dollar amount with respect to DRGs submitted to CMS 
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2.1.2.2 How do physicians get paid under Medicare? 
 
 Medicare Part B pays physicians based on CPT codes submitted by physicians’ office to 
CMS for services provided to the patients. CMS in turn uses Resource-based Relative Value 
Scale (RBRVS) to assign relative weight to each code, which is later used in a formula to 
calculate dollar value for each CPT code submitted, as shown in Figure 2.3. This is a bottom-up 
methodology followed by CMS.  
 
Bottom-up Methodology
CPT Codes
CMS
RBRVS assigns relative 
wt. to each code
Relative Value Units
(RVUs)
- Physician Work (work)
- Practice Expense (PE)
- Malpractice Expense (MP)
Facility Non-Facility
Direct
- Clinical labor
- Medical Supplies
- Medical Equipment
Indirect
- Administration
- Office expense
- All other expenses
Direct
- Clinical labor
- Medical Supplies
- Medical Equipment
Indirect
- Administration
- Office expense
- All other expenses
[(RVU work*GPCI work) +
(RVU PE*GPCI PE) +
(RVU MP*GPCI MP)] CF
Physician Office
In
su
ra
nc
e 
C
om
pa
ny
 
Figure 2.3: Calculating Dollar amount with respect to CPT codes submitted to CMS 
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2.1.3 Bundled Payments (Reese, 2010) 
The Bundled Payments for Care Improvements Initiative was launched by CMS on 
August 23, 2011. The idea was to explore and study four distinct bundled payment models in an 
effort to achieve better health, better care, and reduced expenditures. Of the four models, as 
summarized in Table 2.1 below, three of them utilize a “retrospective” payment model in which 
Medicare makes a discounted traditional fee-for-service payment (in an agreement between CMS 
and the participant provider), which is subsequently reconciled against a target price. The fourth 
payment model uses a “prospective” payment approach, under which CMS makes a single 
bundled payment to the participating provider for an entire episode of care in lieu of traditional 
Part A and Part B fee-for-service payments. More importantly, CMS may permit gain sharing in 
all four models. 
This is also called as “episode of care” or “case rate” payment. This means a single bundled 
payment made for a specific condition such as knee replacement or kidney transplant etc. The 
episode could include different specialists, different facilities, post-operative care etc. involved in 
an “episode”. The payment is typically made to the hospitals, which divide it among providers 
involved in the care. This kind of model is appropriate for acute cases such as heart attack, the 
conditions that have clear beginning and an end (Congressional Budget Office, 2008). In such a 
condition, under this model a single payment would be made to the provider.   
Although this model has its drawbacks, but the model works well in certain cases, such 
as, acute conditions or different acute episodes of chronic conditions as explained in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Variables for which the provider is at risk under alternative payment systems 
(Source: From Volume to Value, NRHI, 2009) 
 
According to a report, The Medicare bundled payments for care improvement initiative: 
An analysis and its implications to potential participants (2011), there are four different types of 
bundled payment models based on whether the patient is being treated for an acute or chronic 
condition. They are – 
2.1.4.1 Model 1: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay only 
  
The episode of care in this model is focused on acute-care inpatient hospitalization. The 
episode of care begins with patient’s admission in a hospital and ends with his/her discharge 
from the hospital. It includes all Part A services furnished by the hospital (regardless of their 
particular MS-DRG) during patient’s stay including diagnostic and related services provided in 3 
days prior to admission by the hospital and/or any entity wholly owned or operated by the 
hospital.  
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2.1.4.2 Model 2: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Plus Post-Acute Care 
  
This model extends the episode of care to include both acute-care hospitalization as well 
as post-acute care following and associated with the acute-care episode. Unlike Model 1, Model 
2 also includes physician and other Part B services associated with the episode for previously 
agreed upon MS-DRGs.  
 The episode begins with the admission of the patient and continues for a minimum of 30 
days post-discharge. Hospital has 2 options to choose with respect to end of episode of care. In 
Option 1, the episode will end between 30 – 89 days post discharge and in Option 2, the episode 
will end a minimum of 90 days post discharge. The episode includes all Part A and Part B 
services provided during patient’s stay in the hospital as well as related services provided during 
post-discharge period including related readmissions.  
 2.1.4.3 Model 3: Retrospective Post-Acute Care Only 
  
The episode of care is limited only to post-acute care following an acute inpatient 
hospital stay. The episode under the model begins with initiation of post-acute care services at a 
skilled nursing facility, inpatient rehabilitation facility, long-term care hospital, or home health 
agency within 30 days of patient’s discharge from an acute care hospital for an agreed upon MS-
DRG.  
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 2.1.4.4 Model 4: Prospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Only 
  
“Model covers both Part A and Part B services furnished during episode of care. Like in 
Model 1, the episode of care involves only the “acute inpatient hospital stay” and it begins upon 
patient’s hospital admission. However, unlike Model 1, there is no clarity on when the episode of 
care ends in Model 4. First, the indication is that the episode ends upon discharge for the acute 
care hospital and includes all Part A and Part B services provided during patient’s stay, including 
services rendered during Medicare 3-day window payment bundling rule. Episode of care in 
Model 4 also includes Part A and Part B services provided during “related admissions”, but 
“post-discharge” period is to be defined by the hospital for the agreed upon MS-DRGs in the 
beginning of contract. In contrast to Model 1, Model 4 includes one single prospective bundled 
payment for both Part A and Part B services’. 
As mentioned earlier there are 4 types of bundled payment models. Table 2.1, shows the 
methodology for calculating amount to be paid under all the 4 models.  
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Table 2.1: Calculating Dollar amount with respect to Bundle Model of Payment 
FEATURE MODEL 1 – Inpatient 
Stay Only 
MODEL 2 – Inpatient Stay + 
Post-discharge Services 
MODEL 3 – Post-discharge 
Services Only 
MODEL 4 – Inpatient Stay Only 
Eligible 
Awardees 
 Physician group practices 
 Acute care hospitals paid 
under the IPP.S 
 Health systems 
 Physician-hospital 
organizations 
 Conveners of 
participating healthcare 
providers 
 Physician group practices 
 Acute care hospitals paid under 
the IPP.S 
 Health systems 
 Physician-hospital organizations 
 Conveners of participating 
healthcare providers 
 Post-acute providers 
  
 Physician group practices 
 Acute care hospitals paid under 
the IPP.S 
 Health systems 
 Physician-hospital organizations 
 Conveners of participating 
healthcare providers 
 Long-term care hospitals 
 Inpatient rehabilitation facilities 
 Skilled nursing facilities 
 Physician group practices 
 Acute care hospitals paid under 
the IPP.S 
 Health systems 
 Physician-hospital organizations 
 Conveners of participating 
healthcare providers 
Payment of 
Bundle and 
Target Price 
Discounted IPP.S payment 
No separate target price 
Retrospective comparison of target 
price and actual FFS payments 
Retrospective comparison of target 
price and actual FFS payments 
Prospectively set payment 
Clinical 
Conditions 
Targeted 
ALL MS-DRGs Applicants to propose based on 
MS-DRG or inpatient hospital stay 
Applicants to propose based on 
MS-DRG or inpatient hospital stay 
Applicants to propose based on 
MS-DRG or inpatient hospital stay 
Types of 
Services 
Included in 
Bundle 
Inpatient hospital services  Inpatient hospital and physician 
services 
 Related post-acute care services 
 Related readmissions 
 Other services defined in the 
bundle 
 Post-acute care services 
 Related readmissions 
 Other services defined in the 
bundle 
 
 Inpatient hospital and physician 
services 
 Related readmissions 
 
Expected 
Discount 
Provided to 
Medicare 
To be proposed by the 
applicant 
CMS requires minimum 
discounts increasing from 0 
% in first 6 months to 2 % 
in year 3 
To be proposed by the applicant  
CMS requires minimum discount 
of 3 % for 30 – 89 days post 
discharge episode, 2 % for 90 days 
or longer episode 
To be proposed by applicant To be proposed by applicant 
Subject to minimum discount of 
3% 
Larger discount for MS-DRGs in 
ACE Demonstration 
Payment from 
CMS to 
providers 
 Acute care hospital: 
IPP.S payment less pre-
determined discount 
 Physician: Traditional fee 
schedule payment (not 
included in episode) 
Traditional fee-for-service 
payment to all providers and 
suppliers, subject to reconciliation 
with predetermined target price 
Traditional fee-for-service 
payment to all providers and 
suppliers, subject to reconciliation 
with predetermined target price 
Prospectively established bundled 
payment to admitting hospital; 
hospitals distribute payments from 
bundled payment 
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2.1.5 PROMETHEUS Payment (Terry, 2010) 
PROMETHEUS which stands for Provider Payment Reform for Outcomes Margins 
Evidence Transparency Hassle-reduction Excellence Understandability and Sustainability was 
result of a joint effort of a team composed of stakeholders (Massachusetts Medical Society, 
2008). This model is a modification of fee-for-service payment model. The physicians are paid 
for fee for service, but also receive high bonuses for providing uncomplicated and efficient care 
to the patients.  
The model is arguably the most advanced payment reimbursement model currently 
available. The model is based on guidelines established by Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs). 
CPGs include guidelines for all the steps, resources etc. required to treat a specific condition. The 
difference between “episode of care” or bundled payment model is that it risk is shared by both 
insurers and physicians (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2008).   
PROMETHEUS Payment intends to fix the shortcomings rather than replacing the two 
most prevalent payment models in the US, namely Fee-for-service and capitation. The models 
attempts to create a payment structure where providers and insurers get incentivized when they 
do the right thing for the patients.   
There are three important improvements over the previous models which differentiate it 
from them. 
- Evidence-based guidelines are setup as a basis for establishing case rate, which 
also includes patient severity of disease. Outstanding performance can get more than 100% of 
the case rate. 
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- Model encourages integration of services around the patient measured on the 
basis of clinical process, outcomes of care, patient experience with care received and sometimes 
cost efficiency.   
- The structure of the model encompasses a wide range of specialties from large 
integrated delivery networks to individual practitioners.    
In Figure 2.5, PROMETHEUS model pays providers based on the most of the resources 
required to deliver CPG based care, which is an ECR. The model uses ECR to determine the 
total resources required to deliver clinical appropriate care. ECR calculates payment for the 
whole time patient stays in the hospital. After the payment amount has been negotiated for a 
provider treating within an ECR, provider has two methods of payment – prospective, and fee-
for-service with retrospective reconciliation. It is up to provider to choose the payment 
mechanism.  
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Services in Clinical Practice Guideline 
(CPG)
PROMETHEUS
Average prevalent price in market of those services 
from current national claim data 
+
Increase to account for normal variation in patients
+
variation in resource utilization in Rx for same 
condition
Prospective
- payment depends on the    ECR triggered
- subjected to Performance contingency 
fund
- 90 % of the monthly bargained for chronic 
conditions, or
  80 % of the monthly bargained for acute 
conditions + quality payment
Retrospective (Fee-for-Service)
- reconciliation at the conclusion of the 
ECR for savings as measured in the 
scoreboard
- subjected to Performance contingency 
fund
- 10 % - 20 % reductions are applicable
Of the Providers total payment for that patient
- for chronic conditions  contingency fund is 10 %
- for acute conditions contingency fund is 20 %
Foot Note
- Comprehensive Scoreboard maintained by Hospital
- Top performers get > 100 % Evidence-based Case Rate (ECR)
  Poor performers get < 100% ECR 
- trigger comes from CPT & ICD – 9 codes sent for claim
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Figure 2.5: PROMETHEUS Model of Payment 
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Section 2 
Reimbursement rates negotiated by hospitals and insurers are regarded as trade secrets 
which are rarely made available to public. For this apparent reason there has been little research 
analyzing variation in rates among insurers. Melnick et. al., (1992) focused on the influence of 
hospital competition on discounts offered by analyzing the data on negotiated per diem rates 
across hospitals for California’s largest PP.O. They used Hirschman-Herfindahl indexes to 
measure hospital competition. MEDSTAT database consisting of claims from employees of self-
insured firms was analyzed for payment rates for appendectomies performed in the hospital. 
Using limited data covering few insurers for large number of hospitals, the authors were able to 
conclude factors determining bargaining power of providers e.g. hospital concentration, 
ownership type, affiliations etc. (Brooks et. al.,, 1997). 
In contrast to the studies mentioned, Staten et. al., (1998) focused on determinants of 
insurer bargaining power. The authors argue that size of insurer alone is not enough to get 
discounts from the hospital. “Insurer must be able to credibly threaten to send its patients 
elsewhere.” Sometimes the patient may be more loyal to a hospital than to an insurer and in that 
case even managed care organizations may not be able to enforce such a threat. Alan T. Sorensen 
(2001) analyzed the data from state of Connecticut and not to his surprise Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) were able to get bigger 
discounts which increase with the size of insurer. He also concluded size alone is not the 
determinant of discount and it requires insurers’ ability to channel the patients to selected 
providers. He also found “charges incurred by Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) tend to be 
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highly skewed toward hospitals with which discounts have been negotiated, and more highly 
skewed allocations tend to be associated with larger discounts.” Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom in the healthcare industry that “volume is the king”, the econometric model suggested 
that “patient channeling” is more important in determining discounts than the insurer size.     
A model is a representation of relationship between different variables, they are generally 
theoretical. In economics, underlying structural parameters are used to construct a simplified 
framework of complex processes. Mathematical techniques are often used to show the 
interaction between a set of variables (Wikipedia). Operations research which is also referred to 
as decision science employs various techniques and tools to arrive at optimal or near optimal 
solutions. Some of the tools or methods used in operations research are optimization, probability 
theory, queuing theory, game theory, graph theory, decision analysis, mathematical modeling 
and simulation. The use of technique depends on various factors, such as, nature of the system, 
the goals of improvement, and constraints on time (bls.gov).   
 The chosen problem in healthcare can be compared to a scenario in which there are 
multiple firms (hospitals) selling same product (services) trying to attract customers (patients) 
from a common pool. There are several constraints involved, like capacity (number of beds, 
physicians, nurses, etc.), specialty if any (pediatric hospital, cancer hospital, etc.), insurance 
company coverage and their contracts etc. Processes in healthcare are more often stochastic in 
nature and hence there is always a possibility of choosing one path over the other. A model could 
be either quantitative or qualitative according to its intended purpose or function. There are many 
models that have been developed to solve such a problem in different industries.   
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Pauly and Redisch (1973), their work still serves as the basis of modeling the hospital-
physician interaction in economics. In their model they considered hospitals as cooperative 
organization largely run by physicians having control of hospital resources. Their model was 
clearly meant to work to maximize physicians’ income and hence had lot of drawbacks.    
 According to Brooks et. al., (1997) there is a potential gain from negotiations by both 
insurers and provider. They used Nash-bargaining model to estimate hospital-insurer negotiation 
over prices. They concluded that hospitals have relatively more bargaining power than insurers 
because of the greater enrollment of population in HMOs that has positive impact on the hospital 
bargaining power with respect to Fee-for-service plans. However there were some 
methodological issues with the study, like the model considered the relationship to be bilateral 
monopoly instead of bilateral oligopoly, and there are no generalizations of Nash-bargaining 
model for the former. This concern reduces the applicability of the model to the real world 
healthcare market.       
Morrisey (2001) concluded selective nature of contracts between healthcare insurers and 
providers has provided formers to obtain lower prices from HMOs. He also concludes that the 
findings are not only generalizable but also stringer when there is more competition in hospital 
market. This potentially means insurers can threaten hospitals by removing them from their 
network.  
Several techniques have been utilized previously to study the process of negotiation 
between market players and most of them have applied in manufacturing and service industries. 
Wang and Zionts (2008) considered a problem which had one buyer and many sellers, called 
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“one-to-many negotiation problem”. They used BATNA (Best Alternatives To a Negotiated 
Agreement) to measure the strength of negotiation and also developed guidelines to help in the 
bargaining process. Using this technique, they were not only able to measure strength of 
negotiation but also settle on one criterion from several available alternatives.   
Stanley Zionts (1979) authored an article “MCDM-If not a Roman Numeral, then What?” 
MCDM or MCDA stands for Multiple Criteria Decision Making or Multiple Criteria Decision 
Analysis. It is a field of operations research that deals with multiple criterions while making 
decisions. One of the major uses of the technique is negotiating cost or price. Since the problem 
involving multiple criterions do have a specific solution, it provides several options to decision 
maker to choose from.   
According to Wallenius et. al., (2008), the potential of MCDM is being explored in new 
areas of research and application such as, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), negotiation 
science, e-commerce, finance, and engineering. They went on further to say that DEA has gained 
so much importance that its relationship with Multiple Objective Linear Programming (MOLP) 
is also being explored. 
One of the pioneering works in the field of goal programming and DEA was conducted 
by Charnes and Cooper (Charnes and Cooper, 1961; Charnes et. al., 1978). The basic difference 
between MOLP and DEA lies in the fact that former uses more general nonradial projections 
compared to radial projections used in the later technique. In other words, MOLP is more generic 
and can be used in benchmarking studies. Whereas DEA is more specific and is used for 
performance measurement of available alternatives (Joro et. al., 1998).  
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2.6 Data envelopment analysis 
Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric productive efficiency measurement 
method for operations with multiple inputs and multiple outputs (Liu et. al., 2013). According to 
Seiford (1996), DEA in its current form was first described in Charnes et. al., (1978), who 
proposed a novel method that combines and transforms multiple inputs and outputs into a single 
efficiency index. This approach first establishes an “efficient frontier” formed by a set of decision 
making units (DMUs) that exhibit best practices and then assigns the efficiency level to other 
non-frontier units according to their distances to the efficient frontier. The basic idea has since 
generated a wide range of variations in measuring efficiency. Today, various DEA efficiency 
models, such as the constant returns to scale (CRS) model, the variable-returns-to-scale (VRS) 
model, the additive model, the slacks-based measures and the free disposal hull (FDH) model, 
etc. are available for different types of measuring requirement. It also has been applied to various 
industrial and non-industrial contexts, such as banking, education, hospital, etc. (Emrouznejad et. 
al., 2008). 
Pioneers of data envelopment analysis (DEA) may not have expected that their ideas 
have inspired the thinking of a group of researchers and have been developed collectively into a 
widely accepted academic field. Thirty some years after the publication of the seminal paper by 
Charnes et. al., (1978), the development continues and has not seen any signs of weakening. In 
2009 alone, more than 700 DEA papers were published. Up through the year 2009, the field has 
accumulated approximately 4500 papers in ISI Web of Science database. 
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2.6.1 DEA applied to healthcare systems 
Since the early 1980s, Hollingsworth (2008) reviewed papers that had used efficiency 
analysis to measure and analyze the productive performance of healthcare services. As shown in 
Figure 2.6, DEA has been used in over 75 per cent of frontier efficiency analysis, and 
furthermore over 50 per cent of applications are in hospitals. Most studies use output (or 
throughput) measures of physical performance, such as inpatient days or discharges. There is 
some use, in 9 per cent of studies, of outcome measures examining changes in health status, 
mortality or quality of care for individuals treated. Input variables are mainly measures of staff 
and capital employed, and most analysis is of technical efficiency.  
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(a)  
 
(b)  
Figure 2.6: (a) Methods and (b) areas of app.lication in efficiency analysis of healthcare 
services. Hollingsworth (2008). 
 
2.6.2 DEA and negotiation science 
The literature on negotiation and group decision making is broad and diverse. The field is 
multidisciplinary, involving different approaches by social psychologists, economists, and 
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management scientists. Reviewing published papers regard to multiple criteria decision making 
(MCDM) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), Wallenius et. al., (2008) stated that 
MCDM/MAUT has begun to penetrate many new areas of research and applications such as 
decision analysis, mathematical programming, DEA, and negotiation analysis. Yet, MCDM and 
DEA developed separately; Belton (1992) and Doyle and Green (1993) described the 
relationships between the two. Subsequently, Joro et. al., (1998) developed a detailed 
understanding of the structural (mathematical) relationship between DEA and MOLP, and noted 
the close similarities that exist. 
Negotiation is a way for parties to reach agreement in a dispute or in making a joint 
decision. In general, negotiations involve one or more issues that need to be settled between two 
or more involved parties (Raiffa, 1982). DEA app.roach, according to Cook and Seiford (2009), 
is a non-parametric technique which allows us to measure, by solving a linear programming 
system, the performance of a subject and to assign to it a score representing its efficiency 
performance. In a recent publication, Wang and Zionts (2008) tied together various existing 
material on negotiation, and propose a quantitative framework, based on existing research 
concepts, for carrying out negotiations. The authors used analysis similar to DEA to come up 
with a measure of efficiency and to choose the best alternative with various input and output 
measures.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to determine relative efficiencies between 
decision making units (DMU) which was first developed by Charnes et. al., (1978). A DMU can 
be any entity, but in this manuscript it refers to the different reimbursement models. DEA helps 
to distinguish between efficient and inefficient DMUs (reimbursement models). Linear 
Programming is the platform for which DEA analyzes the different reimbursement models.  It 
uses a non-parametric method which does not need a production function to determine efficiency 
which is the DMU output/ DMU input ratio. The goal is to enhance efficiency by decreasing 
inputs or increasing outputs. This implies in this manuscript to reducing PACs to enhance 
hospital profitability.  
DEA can be compared to statistical regression analysis as it has similar objectives. 
Regression provides the “average” performance of a DMU, but DEA compares all the DMUs to 
the most efficient DMU being analyzed. The advantage of DEA is that the most efficient DMU 
becomes the “benchmark”. This DMU becomes a target for other less efficient DMUs in the 
reference set. Regression analysis does not distinguish the efficient DMU from the inefficient 
DMUs. 
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3.1 DEA formulation 
The DEA model considers a set of n DMUs where each DMU j, (j=1,...,n) uses m inputs 
xij (i=1,...,m) to generate s outputs yrj (r=1,...,s). Given that all inputs and outputs are not equally 
weighted, multipliers are introduced to distinguish among inputs and outputs. If the multipliers 
ru , iv associated with outputs r and inputs i, respectively, are known, then conventional 
benefit/cost theory can express DMU  technical efficiency je  as the ratio of weighted outputs to 
weighted inputs.  
i
iji
r
rjr xvyu
         (3.1) 
According to Cook and Seiford (2009), the benefit/cost ratio above is the basis for the 
standard engineering ratio of productivity. In the absence of known multipliers, Charnes et. al., 
(1978) proposed deriving appropriate multipliers for a given DMU by solving a particular non-
linear programming problem. Charnes et. al., (1978) model for measuring the DMU technical 
efficiency is provided for the following fractional programming problem: 
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      (3.2) 
where, ε is a non-Archimedean value designed to enforce strict positivity on the variables.  
Equation 3.2 is referred to as the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) model. It provides for 
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS). This original publication on DEA simply restricted the 
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variables to be non-negative (ε=0). The imposition of a strictly positive lower limit (ε>0) was 
introduced in a follow-up paper, Charnes et. al., (1981).  
It is essential to point out that the CCR model in Equation (3.2) is referred to as the input-
oriented minimization model. The inversion of the CCR model illustrated in Equation (3.2) is 
referred to as the output-oriented minimization problem. This fractional programming problem is 
converted to linear programming problem by applying the Charnes and Cooper (1962) theory. 
This specifically refers to changing µr = tur and υi = tvi, such that
1
i
ioi xvt . The linear 
programming formulation is presented in Equation. (3.3). 
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The equivalent minimization linear programming formulation is presented in equation 
(3.4). 
      (3.4) 
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Equation (3.4) is referred to as the envelopment or primal problem, and Equation (3.3) is 
the multiplier or dual problem. To get a geometric appreciation for the CRS model, one can 
represent problem (3.3) in a graphical form such as Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: single input single output example. (Source: Cook and Seiford, 2009) 
 
Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of a single input single output case. Solving Equation 
(3.3) for each of the DMUs illustrates that DMU #2 is the most efficient. The efficient frontier is 
plotted by connecting a line from the origin through DMU #2. Any DMUs to the right of this 
efficient frontier line represents the inefficient DMUs. For example DMU #3 is an inefficient 
DMU. Its projection to the efficient frontier is represented by the point 3*. The relative 
efficiency of DMU #3 is measured as the ratio A/B = 4.2/6 = .70. DMU #3 is 70% as efficient as 
DMU #2. 
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An alternative geometric view of Equation (3.3) is provided in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A two input one output example. (Source: Cook and Seiford, 2009) 
 
 
 
Solving Equation (3.3) results in DMUs A, B, C and D being identified as efficient (, i.e., 
θA = θB = θC = θD = 100%).  The CCR model is appropriately utilized to provide the radial 
projection. Specifically, each input is reduced by the same proportionality factor θ. DMU E θE = 
83.3% efficient, and the resulting projected value EE x
*  is simply the frontier DMU B. DMU B is 
the ‘‘benchmark” for DMU E. DMU G  projection to the efficient frontier is point K. Therefore 
DMU B and DMU C are appropriate benchmarks for DMU G.  
DEA has been universally recognized as a useful tool of performance assessment, but 
very often more than one DMU is evaluated as DEA efficient, which makes DEA efficient units 
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unable to be compared or ranked. Therefore, the assurance region concept was developed, 
initially by Thompson et. al. (1986, 1990) to prohibit large differences in the values of 
multipliers, and imposes constraints on the relative magnitudes of those multipliers. In this 
manuscript the non-Archimedean condition is
1
1
m
i
iox . This discrimination impact of 
assurance region restrictions can be visualized in Figure 3.3. DMUs that are efficient in an 
unrestricted setting (ε = 0), such as DMU D in Figure 3.2, may be rendered inefficient as in 
Figure 3.3. Details on imposing minimum weight restrictions on inputs and outputs to provide 
discrimination between DMUs can be found in Wang et. al. (2009). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Impact of assurance region restrictions. (Source: Cook and Seiford, 2009) 
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3.2 PCA formulation 
3.2.1 Overview 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistical technique first 
introduced by Hotelling (1933) to explain variance-covariance structure in a data set, using linear 
combinations of the original variables. According to Johnson and Wichern (2007) and Rencher 
(2002), its main objectives are: (1) reduction of dimensionality, and (2) data interpretation. 
Although q components are necessary to reproduce the overall variability of a system, 
most of this variability can be represented by a small number k of principal components. This 
means that there is almost as much information on k principal components as in the q original 
variables. Therefore, the general idea of PCA is that k principal components can be substituted, 
without significant loss of information, by q original variables. The original data set consisting of 
n positions (of observations) of the q variables is reduced to a set of  n positions (scores) of k 
principal components. 
According to Rencher (2002), PCA often reveals relationships that were not previously 
identified with the original set, which results in a broader interpretation of the phenomenon 
under study. Johnson and Wichern (2007) validate PCA as an intermediate step in the data 
analysis. 
Gabrielsson et. al. (2003b) define PCA as a least squares fit of a straight line or a 
plane/hyperplane that is N-dimensional (for data) in a K-dimensional space of principal 
components. In the case presented by Figure 3.4 which is adapted from Gabrielsson et. al. 
(2003b), the data are centered on the average and three original variables are described by only 
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two principal components. The object is projected onto the mathematical plane described by the 
components, and the scores on each component are obtained by determining the distances 
between the origin and the projected object. Eigenvectors, also called "loadings", represent the 
coefficients of direction of the fitted plan. The perpendicular distance between the object and the 
plane is the distance to the model. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Geometric interpretation of PCA. (Source: Gabrielsson et. al., 2003) 
 
 
3.2.2 Algebraic approach 
Principal component analysis is one of the most widely used tools applied to summarize 
common patterns of variation among variables. Algebraically, it is a linear combination  of q 
random variables Y1, Y2, …, Yq. Geometrically, these combinations represent a new coordinate 
system obtained during the rotation of the original system (Johnson and Wichern, 2007; 
Mukherjee and Ray, 2008; Paiva et. al.,2008; Peruchi et. al., 2013). The axes are now the 
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variables Y1, Y2, …, Yq and represent the direction of maximum variance. Principal components 
are uncorrelated and depend only on the covariance matrix Σ (or the correlation matrix ρ) of the 
variables Y1, Y2, …, Yq and its development does not require the assumption of multivariate 
normality . 
The required information to obtain the scores of the first principal component (PC1), as 
defined by Johnson and Wichern (2002), come from the linear combination that is able to 
maximize the variance, in accordance with Equation (3.5). 
1:
:
11
1
ee
Ye
toSubject
VarMaximize
 
      
  (3.5) 
In the optimization problem above, the product of the decision variables are limited to 
unit length, for eliminating indeterminacy of the solution, since e1 can be multiplied by any 
scalar. To obtain the scores of the second principal component (PC2), the problem represented in 
Equation (3.5) is changed into Equation (3.6) to guarantee PC1 and PC2 being orthogonal 
vectors. 
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In general, the i
th
 principal component is the solution for the linear combination CTQe i  
which maximizes the variance in Equation (3.7): 
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The result of the lexicographical optimization problem described above determines the 
eigenvalues as solution to the objective function and the optimal solution of the decision 
variables which are represented by the eigenvectors of each principal component. Using the pairs 
of eigenvalues and eigenvectors of each principal component (λ1, e1), (λ2, e2), ..., (λq, eq) where λ1 
≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λq ≥ 0, the principal component scores can be calculated by linear combination below 
qiqqiiiii ,,2,12211  YeYeYeYePC      
(3.8) 
as well as the percentage of explanation of the i
th
 principal component using 
qi
q
j
j
i ,,2,1
1
          (3.9) 
The principal components may also be obtained by the standardized variables 
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          (3.10) 
In matrix notation, 
μXVZ
121          (3.11) 
where 21V  is the diagonal matrix of standard deviation. Clearly, E (Z) = 0, and
ρ
121121
VΣVZCov . The principal components scores of Z can be obtained from the 
eigenvectors of the correlation matrix ρ of Y. All previous results apply, with some 
simplifications, since the variance of each Zi is unity. The notation will be the same for PCi 
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referring to the i
th
 principal component and (λi, ei) for pairs of eigenvalue-eigenvector of the 
matrix Σ or ρ. However, (λi, ei) derived from Σ is generally not exactly the same as derived from 
ρ. 
Johnson and Wichern (2007) determine that the assumption of multivariate normality is 
not required. Moreover, Σˆ  has pairs of eigenvalues-eigenvectors ii e,λ ˆ
ˆ  that are the same for the 
matrix sample variance-covariance S. Therefore, both S and Σˆ  provide the same sample 
principal components Ye i and the same percentage of explained variance qi
q
j
ji ,,2,1
1
 . 
Finally, both S and Σˆ provide the same correlation matrix R, then if the variables are 
standardized, the choice of S or Σˆ  is irrelevant. 
3.2.3 Deciding how many principal components to analyze 
In any application, a decision should be taken in relation to how many principal 
components should be retained to effectively represent the original data set. Rencher (2002) 
proposed some guidelines which are explained below: 
• Hold components able to sufficiently explain a specific percentage of the original data 
variance, for example, 80%. 
• Hold components that the eigenvalues are larger than the average of eigenvalues 
p
i
i p
1
. For the correlation matrix, the average is 1. 
• Utilize the scree plot, which shows λi versus i, to distinguish the "large" eigenvalues to 
the "small" eigenvalues. 
• Test the significance of the "larger" eigenvalues. 
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Johnson and Wichern (2007) state that there is no definitive method to determine how 
many components to retain in the analysis. However, some things must be taken into 
consideration are the amount of variance explained, eigenvalues size and interpretation of the 
principal components of the subject discussed. The authors also state that the scree plot is a 
useful visual method. Furthermore, the authors suggest retaining the principal components that 
are able to explain a proportion of at least 1/p of the total variance. Johnson and Winchern (2007) 
have emphasized that there is no definitive rule regarding how many principal components to be 
retained in the study. It is recommended that a combination of techniques mentioned above or 
even multiple analyses be considered for different amounts of principal components. 
3.2.4 Interpretation of the principal components 
Note that the principal components generated by the matrix R are not compatible with 
those obtained by the matrix S. In cases that the variance between the original variables have 
significant discrepancy, the matrix R can provide better results. For example, if a variable 
displays a much higher variance than others in the original data set, this variable will dominate 
the first principal component. 
3.2.5 Rotation 
The principal components are initially obtained by the axes rotation in order to align with 
the natural variability of the system, in which new variables become uncorrelated and reflect the 
direction of maximum variance. Figure 3.5 illustrates the rotation imposed on the axes composed 
by the original variables (y1 and y2) to obtain the principal components (z1 and z2) based on 
Rencher’s (2002) analysis. Note that the line formed by the major axis seems to be a regression 
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line (Figure 3.6). The perpendicular distance from any point to this line is minimized rather than 
simply minimizing the vertical distance. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Principal component transformation for the sons data. (Source: Rencher, 2002) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The first principal component as a perpendicular regression line. (Source: 
Rencher, 2002) 
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3.2.6 Correlation between original variables and principal components 
Denote the correlation between the i
th
 variable yi and j
th
 principal component zj by ryizj. 
Since the vectors zj are orthogonal, the relationship can be written as a joint quadratic correlation 
as defined in Equation (3.12): 
2
,,
222
121 kikiii zzyzyzyzy
Rrrr           (3.12) 
Where, k is the number of components retained and 2 ,,1 ki zzyR   is the multiple squared 
correlation (or coefficient of determination) of an yi given the zj. Note that an inverse analysis 
from 2 ,,1 ki yyzR   would be inconclusive because of multi-collinearity present in the data set of the 
original variables. A recommended analysis by Rencher (2002) interprets the coefficients 
obtained from the extracted eigenvectors of the matrix R or S. 
3.3 DEA-PCA formulation 
Zhu (1998) suggested that the principal component analysis could be applied to ‘output 
divided by input’ ratios as a complementary approach to DEA. The idea of combining DEA and 
PCA methodologies to achieve dimension reduction was developed independently by Ueda and 
Hoshiai (1997) and Adler and Golany (2001, 2002). These papers suggest that the variables can 
be divided into groups, based on their logical composition with respect to the production process, 
and then replaced with principal components representing each group separately. If most of the 
population variance can be attributed to the first few components, then they can replace the 
original variables with minimal loss of information. Let the random vector Y = [Y1 ,Y2 ,. . .,Yq ] 
(in our case the original inputs or outputs chosen to be aggregated) possess the covariance matrix 
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Σ with eigenvalues λ1≥ λ2≥…≥ λq ≥ 0 and normalized eigenvectors  e1, e2, …, eq. The new 
variables, commonly known as principal components, are weighted sums of the original data 
which are represented by the linear combination in Equation (3.13). 
kiqkqiCov
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    (3.13) 
The principal components, YPC1, YPC2,..., YPCq , are the uncorrelated linear combinations 
ranked by their variances in descending order. The complete set of principal components is as 
large as the original set of variables. Ey is the matrix of all ei whose dimensions drop from q x q 
to h x q, as principal components are dropped (Ypc becomes an h x n matrix). Principal 
components can be used to replace  all the inputs  and/or outputs simultaneously or as specified 
groups of variables with a common theme. Thus linear program in Equation (3.14) refers to both 
the original data and principal components in order to present a generalized formulation (Adler 
and Yazhemsky, 2010). 
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Subscript “o” is the index of original variables and “pc” is the index of principal components; Ipc 
represents an m x n input matrix; Opc an r x n output matrix; I
a
 and O
a
 input and output column 
vectors for DMUa respectively. V and U are multipliers for inputs and outputs.  
Using principal components in place of original data does not affect the properties of the 
DEA models. Principal components represent the selection of a new coordinate system obtained 
by rotating the original system with x1,..., xq as the coordinate axes rather than the parallel 
translation of the coordinate system. Thus PCA–DEA may be applied to all basic DEA models 
despite their lack of translation or units invariance. The disadvantage of PCA–DEA is that the 
data must be transformed and then, once results are obtained, it must be transformed back to the 
original form in order to find the targets for improvement. The results obtained from DEA with 
respect to each DMU reflect its position within the production possibility set relative to the 
efficient section of the boundary. The imposition of weights restrictions in DEA will render parts 
of the efficient boundary of the production possibility set no longer efficient. 
Allen et. al., (1997) and Dyson et. al., (2001) interpreted inefficiency rating, 
improvement targets and efficient peers under weights restrictions. The targets and efficient peers 
obtained could reflect a substantial change in the current mix of input–output levels of the 
inefficient DMUs. A similar phenomenon occurs under the PCA–DEA formulation (as a result of 
the free sign in PCA). However, problems related to discrimination often arise. In extreme cases, 
the majority of DMUs may prove efficient, which means that there is a need for a trade-off 
between complete DEA information and the need to improve discrimination. It may be 
reasonable to argue that a decrease in one input accompanied by an increase in another input may 
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well lead to a more efficient DMU. PCA–DEA affects the DEA results in a similar manner to 
adding weight restrictions but without additional preferential information from decision makers. 
Dropping several principal components that generally do not explain the variance appears to 
reduce the edges of the frontier. Thus removing the extreme (super-efficient) DMUs is generally 
in line with the cone-ratio or assurance region constraints. 
3.4 DEA Approach Applied to Negotiate Reimbursement Plans in Healthcare Systems - 
Detailed procedure 
The stepwise procedure, proposed by Feng and Antony (2010), presented in Figure (3.7) 
was used as a roadmap for Six Sigma practitioners to implement their DEA-enhanced projects. 
The procedure can also be utilized for Six Sigma Black Belts projects. This detailed procedure is 
adapted to negotiate reimbursement plans in healthcare systems in this manuscript. The Six 
Sigma DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control) roadmap is utilized to illustrate 
the development of the DEA combined with PCA to determine the most appropriate 
reimbursement plan that healthcare facility can negotiate with insurance companies based on 
reduction of PACs. If the provider decides to apply a specific reimbursement model,  the 
practitioner must perform DMAIC phases; otherwise, DMAC phases are sufficient to rank and to 
identify which payment model is the best alternative based on PACs. Figure (3.8) shows how to 
perform the step A6 in which the practitioner have to apply an appropriate DEA model to obtain 
efficiency scores for DMUs. 
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Figure 3.7: Stepwise procedure to apply DEA-DMAIC roadmap as an add tool to negotiate 
reimbursement plans in healthcare systems (adapted from Feng and Antony, 2010). 
D1. Identify the decision-making units 
(DMUs)
D2. Define inputs and outputs involved 
in assessing DMUs` efficiency
M3. Develop data collection plan
M4. Collect inputs and outputs data
M5. Verify data accuracy and reliability
A6. Apply appropriate DEA models to 
obtain efficiency scores for DMUs
Particular model?
N
Y
A7. Analyze relatively efficient DMU
A8. Analyze relatively inefficient DMUs
I9. Provide reference set for inefficient 
units
I10. Set performance targets for all units
C11. Validate improvement by pilot 
studies
C12. Verify benefits, cost savings and 
profit growth
START
END
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Figure 3.8: procedure to apply the DEA model for obtaining efficiency scores for DMUs 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Define phase 
The Define phase of Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap usually outlines project goals, customer 
deliverables, resources and the Critical-To-Quality (CTQ) characteristics. A typical DEA-
enhanced Six Sigma project involves the performance/productivity/efficiency evaluation among 
A6.1 Apply CCR model
Good 
discrimination?
N
Y
A6.2 Assess correlation between PACs
A6.3 Apply PCA
A6
A6.4 Change constraint for the weights
Significant 
correlations?
N
Y
A7
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DMUs, which need to be clearly identified in the Define phase as well as the multiple inputs and 
outputs of DMUs. The DMUs in a health organization can be individual physicians, nurses, 
examination rooms or clinical departments. In this manuscript the DMUs are the reimbursement 
models. The inputs may take forms of costs, salary, time, number of physicians/nurses in a clinic 
and other resources. This research has considered PAC costs. The outputs of the function 
performed by the DMUs can be number of patients or number of severe cases. In this manuscript 
the output was the cost savings associated to PACs.  
There are six different DMUs used in the research as described in Chapter 3. The DMUs 
in my research are six types of payment models grouped into three categories: Fee-for-service, 
PROMETHEUS and Bundled (Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4), will be considered 
to build a strategic optimization model. There are  
 The variables to be considered are inpatient procedural (AMI, Pneumonia, and Stroke) 
and inpatient medical (Knee, Hip, BARI, COLON, and CABG). The input from these variables 
consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, PAC treatment (PAC Rx), PAC 
readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of PAC professional, PAC 
treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more than 10%, which is mainly 
dependent in how much hospital can save.  
 
3.4.2 Measure phase 
The Measure phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap quantifies and benchmarks the 
process based on actual data. Six Sigma requires that data be collected accurately and reliably. 
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Otherwise, ‘garbage in and garbage out’ phenomena would happen regardless of the model 
utilized for analysis. Therefore, this phase involves developing a collection plan, collecting data, 
and verifying data accuracy and reliability. For the reimbursement models considered in this 
manuscript the data is usually deterministic, rather than random variables. This data is based on 
observations from past decisions (inputs) and resultant outputs (Feng and Antony, 2010).  
The data used in the model is from Healthcare Incentive Improvement Institute, Inc.  
Their website www.hci3.org has data for public use. The data for the research is from CMMI 
Bundled Payment Pilot Analysis Package (a national database with over 4.7 million people 
covered). 
3.4.3 Analyze phase 
The Analyze phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap intends to apply the DEA model 
developed in this manuscript to select the best reimbursement plan. This analysis is performed at 
three different levels: 
1. Individual analyses for each DRGs; 
2. Analyses of DRG groups; 
3. Aggregated analysis. 
3.4.4 Improve phase 
The Improve phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap determines the best solution using 
optimization approaches. In this manuscript, improve phase will be performed only if the 
provider decides to select their reimbursement model for very specific types of DRGs. There is a 
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chance that selected model not being considered efficient; therefore, DEA can show which PAC 
should be reduced to make the selected model more efficient. 
3.4.5 Control phase 
The Control phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap checks the process for statistically 
significance before/after the improvement. Controls need to be implemented to hold the gains, 
which involve monitoring DMUs’ performance, developing corrective procedures and training 
people who run the process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Section 1 
There are six different DMUs used in the research. The DMUs in my research are six 
types of payment models grouped into three categories: Fee-for-service, PROMETHEUS and 
Bundled (Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4), will be considered to build a strategic 
optimization model. There are  
 The variables to be considered are inpatient procedural (AMI, Pneumonia, and Stroke) 
and inpatient medical (Knee, Hip, BARI, COLON, and CABG). The input from these variables 
consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, PAC treatment (PAC Rx), PAC 
readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of PAC professional, PAC 
treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more than 10%, which is mainly 
dependent in how much hospital can save.  
 An application of the DMAIC procedure is presented in section 4.1 for a single 
DRG, AMI. Next, the analyses for the remaining DRGs as well as an overall assessment are 
shown in section 4.2.  
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4.1 Application for a single DRG 
4.1.1 Define phase 
 
There are six different DMUs used in the research. These DMUs, six types of payment 
models grouped into three categories: Fee-for-service, PROMETHEUS and Bundled (Model 2, 
Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4), will be considered to build a strategic optimization model.  
The input from these variables consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, 
PAC treatment (PAC Rx), PAC readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of 
PAC professional, PAC treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more 
than 10%, which is mainly dependent on how much hospital can save.  
4.1.2 Measure phase 
 
The data used in the model is a publicly available data from www.hci3.org. The 
Prometheus playbook available on the website has data that comes from their developmental 
database (a national database with over 4.7 million covered lives). The numbers for the 
optimization model were derived from the playbook.  
 
4.1.3 Analyze phase 
 
To assess the relative efficiency, the input-oriented CCR model in Equation (3.3) was 
specified for this problem with five inputs and one output. The linear programming model was 
easily solved using Excel Solver for j0 = 1, ..., 6. Each time the model was suitably modified for 
64 
 
the unit being assessed. Figure (4.1) shows the model being executed by the DMU, 
PROMETHEUS. The obtained optimal values for r , i  and e0 provide information on the 
weights for inputs and outputs and the DEA score for the respective unit. This information can 
be further used to rank DEA scores, identify the reference set and set the performance target. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Excel solver of CCR model being solved for the DMU PROMETHEUS 
 
 
The optimal value of e0 indicates the DEA score for each unit, which is shown in Figure 
4.1. If the DEA score equals to 100% and the constraints 1 and 2 are attended, the unit being 
assessed is said to be efficient. Therefore, PROMETHEUS was the unique DMU considered 
efficient when analyzing the dataset for the DRG, AMI. 
 
4.1.4 Improve phase 
 
The results from the DEA’s solution can be interpreted to provide reference sets for 
inefficient units and to set performance targets for all units. However, these steps are required in 
Model/ AMI Output
Typical 
Episode
PAC 
Professional PAC Rx
PAC IP 
Readdmission
Added 
Burden Savings
Sum 
Inputs
Sum 
Outputs e 0 1 2
FFS $24,467 $2,551 $151 $17,703 $7,019 0 1.00       0.00          0% (1.00) <= 0 1.00 = 1
PROMETHEUS $24,467 $2,551 $151 $17,703 $7,019 $2,742.43 1.00       1.00          100% (0.00) <= 0 1.00 = 1
Model 2 $22,232 $1,020 $125 $6,242.94 $3,017.42 $1,040.49 0.63       0.38          60% (0.25) <= 0 0.63 = 1
Model 3 $18,295 $1,410 $173 $8,631.36 $4,171.82 $1,438.56 0.63       0.52          83% (0.11) <= 0 0.63 = 1
Model 4 $22,382 $1,256 $154 $7,687.98 $3,715.86 $1,281.33 0.68       0.47          69% (0.21) <= 0 0.68 = 1
Model 3+4 $42,374 $2,665 $326 $16,319 $7,888 $2,719.89 1.34       0.99          74% (0.35) <= 0 1.34 = 1
Weights 1.93E-05 1.9271E-05 1.9E-05 1.9271E-05 1.93E-05 0.000365
>=
1.9271E-05 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1
Inputs Constraints
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situations where the provider has already decided to implement a particular reimbursement plan 
and the selected plan was considered inefficient. For instance, a particular hospital has decided to 
implement “Model 3+4”. Figure 4.2 show that the efficiency was assessed in 74% and the 
reference set for this DMU is the DMU PROMETHEUS (constraint 1 for DMU PROMETHEUS 
was equal to zero, or 
i
iji
r
rjr xvyu ). Therefore, performance targets for the DMU Model 
3+4 could be set, based on reducing PACs according to the results for the efficient DMU in CCR 
model analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Excel solver of CCR model being solved for the DMU Model 3+4 
 
 
4.1.5 Control phase 
 
Validation of the savings obtained from adoption of a particular model must be assessed 
in order to confirm that the model selected was the benchmark. The analyst can also monitor 
PACs using statistical control charts, which have been widely used in healthcare applications for 
monitoring and improvement of hospital performance. PACs in healthcare systems can be 
Model/ AMI Output
Typical 
Episode
PAC 
Professional PAC Rx
PAC IP 
Readdmission
Added 
Burden Savings
Sum 
Inputs
Sum 
Outputs e 0 1 2
FFS $24,467 $2,551 $151 $17,703 $7,019 0 0.75       0.00          0% (0.75) <= 0 0.75 = 1
PROMETHEUS $24,467 $2,551 $151 $17,703 $7,019 $2,742.43 0.75       0.75          100% (0.00) <= 0 0.75 = 1
Model 2 $22,232 $1,020 $125 $6,242.94 $3,017.42 $1,040.49 0.47       0.28          60% (0.19) <= 0 0.47 = 1
Model 3 $18,295 $1,410 $173 $8,631.36 $4,171.82 $1,438.56 0.47       0.39          83% (0.08) <= 0 0.47 = 1
Model 4 $22,382 $1,256 $154 $7,687.98 $3,715.86 $1,281.33 0.51       0.35          69% (0.16) <= 0 0.51 = 1
Model 3+4 $42,374 $2,665 $326 $16,319 $7,888 $2,719.89 1.00       0.74          74% (0.26) <= 0 1.00 = 1
Weights 1.44E-05 1.43735E-05 1.4E-05 1.43735E-05 1.44E-05 0.000272
>=
1.9271E-05 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1
Inputs Constraints
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compared to defects in manufacturing context. Therefore, after identifying the best 
reimbursement model, the hospital can track PACs in its processes to achieve higher benefits, 
cost savings and profit growth. 
4.2 Remaining DRGs and overall analyses  
 
The summarized results are presented in Table 4.2 and in Figure 4.3. Table is color coded 
for easier understanding, where red color means least efficient, green the most efficient model 
and yellow somewhere in the middle. As expected FFS is the least efficient model among all the 
models of reimbursement since providers do not save anything. The Table 4.2 below has an 
empty box for Model 4 in DRG BARI column, which means episode of BARI does not extend 
long and so there is no data available to see how much was spent on it and how much could be 
saved. If provider can negotiate for Model 4 reimbursement model for BARI, it would be 100% 
saving for them! 
 From Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 it can be deduced that PROMETHEUS is the most 
efficient model for most of the DRGs considered in the study. Model 3 and Model 4 are most 
efficient for COLON and CABG respectively. In case of Pneumonia and Hip replacement, 
Model 4 along with PROMETHEUS is the most efficient model of reimbursement.   
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Table 4.2: Summary of Relative Efficiency of DMUs for all DRGs and Sum of all DRGs 
evaluated using CCR-DEA Optimization Model 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Relative Efficiency of DMUs for all DRGs and Sum of all DRGs evaluated using 
CCR-DEA Optimization Model 
 
Section 2 
Firstly, section 4.3 shows an application to a group of DRGs using a PCA-DEA 
approach. Some steps are described more briefly due to similarity to previous section. As long as 
the problem is the same, only a different perspective is introduced to determine a new point of 
CCR-DEA All AMI Pneumonia Stroke Knee Hip BARI Colon CABG
FFS 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PROMETHEUS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 88% 55%
Model 2 72% 60% 75% 72% 68% 83% 70% 100% 26%
Model 3 97% 83% 80% 34% 88% 74% 66% 78% 100%
Model 4 66% 69% 100% 21% 50% 100% #DIV/0! 89% 66%
Model 3+4 82% 74% 35% 21% 88% 48% 33% 67% 72%
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view when evaluating group of DRGs, in this case, medical inpatient. Secondly, result analyses 
are extended to procedural group of DRGs and an overall assessment in section 4.4.  
4.3 Application to a group of DRGs 
4.1.1 Define phase 
 
As mentioned in section 4.1, DMUs assessed in this manuscript are: Fee-for-service, 
PROMETHEUS and Bundled (Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4). The input from 
these variables consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, PAC treatment (PAC Rx), 
PAC readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of PAC professional, PAC 
treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more than 10%, which is mainly 
dependent in how much hospital can save.  
 
4.1.2 Measure phase 
 
The data used in the model is a publicly available data from www.hci3.org. The 
Prometheus playbook available on the website has data that comes from their developmental 
database (a national database with over 4.7 million covered lives). The numbers for the 
optimization model were derived from the playbook. Medical inpatient was the group of DRGs 
analyzed in this section.  
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4.1.3 Analyze phase 
 
To assess the relative efficiency, the input-oriented CCR model in Equation 3.3 was 
specified for this problem with five inputs and one output. The linear programming model was 
easily solved using Excel Solver for j0 = 1, ..., 6. Each time the model was suitably modified for 
the unit being assessed. Figure 4.4 shows the model being executed for the DMU, 
PROMETHEUS. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the discrimination between DMUs was not 
satisfactory to identify which DMU was the most efficient. As a solution, the correlation 
structure between PACs was evaluated to determine the feasibility of using PCA as a reduction 
strategy of inputs, and consequently, improvement of the discrimination in this analysis. Figure 
4.5 shows that most of the correlations between PACs were significant with 0.05 of significance 
level.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Excel solver of CCR model being solved for the DMU PROMETHEUS 
 
 
Model/ AMI Output
Typical 
Episode
PAC 
Professional PAC Rx
PAC IP 
Readdmission
Added 
Burden Savings
Sum 
Inputs
Sum 
Outputs e 0 1 2
FFS $44,144 $5,892 $548 $62,399 $24,831 0 $1 $0 0% -$1 <= 0 $1 = 1
PROMETHEUS $44,144 $5,892 $548 $62,399 $24,831 $9,366.88 $1 $1 100% $0 <= 0 $1 = 1
Model 2 $42,798 $2,431 $296 $14,149 $6,005 $2,288.07 $0 $0 98% $0 <= 0 $0 = 1
Model 3 $28,815 $2,588 $316 $15,236 $6,650 $2,478.97 $0 $0 100% $0 <= 0 $0 = 1
Model 4 $42,951 $1,401 $253 $8,496 $4,035 $1,418.48 $0 $0 100% $0 <= 0 $0 = 1
Model 3+4 $71,765 $3,989 $569 $23,732 $10,685 $3,897 $0 $0 100% $0 <= 0 $0 = 1
Weights 1.68E-07 1.51924E-05 0 1.44729E-05 0 0.000107
>=
0 0.005615 0.509251084 0 0.485133683 0 1
Inputs Constraints
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Figure 4.5: Correlation structure between PACs 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 presents the principal component analysis for PACs of medical inpatients 
based on the covariance matrix. As emphasized in Figure 4.6, only PC1 is enough to explain the 
variability of the original data set. Therefore, PACs were replaced by the scores of principal 
components and the CCR model was executed over again. The results in Table 4.2 determine 
that the new model could distinguish better efficient from inefficient DMUs. 
 
 
Fig 4.6: Principal component analysis for PACs 
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Figure 4.7: Relative Efficiency of Model 4 Reimbursement Model for Procedural DRGs 
evaluated using PCA-DEA Optimization model 
 
 
4.1.4 Improve phase 
 
The results from the DEA’s solution can be interpreted to provide reference sets for 
inefficient units and to set performance targets for all units. Since the aim of this study is not 
related to a particular reimbursement model, the improve phase was not performed for this 
dataset. 
4.1.5 Control phase 
 
Validation of the savings obtained from adoption of a particular model must be assessed 
in order to confirm that the model selected was the benchmark. The analyst can also monitor 
PACs using statistical control charts, which have been widely used in healthcare applications for 
monitoring and improvement of hospital performance. PACs in healthcare systems can be 
compared to defects in manufacturing context. Using PCA, only one vector (PC1) represents the 
Out put
Typical 
Episode
PC 1 0
Sum 
Inputs
Sum 
Outputs
Effeciency
FFS 44144 67402 0 1 0 0% -1 <= 0 1 = 1
PROMETHEU 44144 67402 6740 1 1 100% 0 <= 0 1 = 1
Model 2 42798 15494 1549 1 0 44% 0 <= 0 1 = 1
Model 3 28815 16748 1675 0 0 61% 0 <= 0 0 = 1
Model 4 42951 9454 945 0 0 30% 0 <= 0 0 = 1
Model 3+4 71765 26202 2620 1 0 44% 0 <= 0 1 = 1
Weights 8.96E-06 8.96E-06 1.48E-04
>=
8.96E-06 0.5 0.5 1.0
Model/ 
Procedural
Input Constraints
1 2
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entire PAC dataset; thereby, an alternative control system may be implemented based on PC1 
analysis. 
 
4.4 Application to the groups procedural and medical inpatient and overall analyses 
 
The PCA-DEA optimization model was run for both procedural and medical inpatients 
group of DRGs as well as for sum of all the DRGs. The summary of results is presented in Table 
4.2 and Figure 4.8. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of Relative Efficiency of DMUs for Procedural and Medical DRGs 
and Sum of all DRGs evaluated using PCA-DEA Optimization Model 
 
 
 
 
 
PCA-DEA All Procedural Medical
FFS 0% 0% 0%
PROMETHEUS 100% 100% 83%
Model 2 60% 44% 60%
Model 3 96% 61% 100%
Model 4 61% 30% 71%
Model 3+4 79% 44% 86%
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Figure 4.8: Summary of Relative Efficiency of DMUs for Procedural and Medical DRGs 
and Sum of all DRGs evaluated using PCA-DEA Optimization Model 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The PPACA law or the Obama care aims at improving the quality and increasing the 
affordability of health insurance. The law also aims to reduce escalating healthcare costs and 
improve healthcare outcomes by moving from current quantity driven system to more quality 
driven system. To improve accountability in the delivery of healthcare, Medicare & Medicaid 
and private insurers have developed several reimbursement plans/models as mentioned in 
Chapter 1.  
Payment is not the only factor influencing the behavior of provider and patient, but its 
importance has been recognized. The importance of aligning payment policies with quality 
improvement has been emphasized in “Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 
21
st
 century” (Institute of Medicine, 2001). The committee has called for all the purchasers to 
come together and look at their payment policies to removes the barriers that impede 
improvement. They have mentioned the importance of stronger incentives in quality 
improvement.   
According to Jencks et. al., (2009), Medicare readmissions because are frequent cost a lot 
to the overall healthcare system, including to the hospitals. To address this situation policy 
makers are increasingly interested in solving the problem by pushing for new reimbursement 
plans. These reimbursement and environmental changes combined together have put great 
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pressure on financial performance of hospitals. In some cases the stress has been so much so that 
it resulted in closure of the hospital.     
One of the critical factors in financial success of all industries is how well it manages its 
costs. The introduction of prospective payment systems and managed competition, has 
diminished the importance of cost management as a single critical factor. “Reimbursement 
changes create the need to maintain and stabilize revenue streams, and revenue factors are 
emerging as key corollaries to hospital financial success.” 
 In such a dynamic environment, where hospitals are closing or are being bought by 
bigger hospitals or insurance companies, it becomes important for not only their survival but also 
their financial success that they have a strategy while negotiation for reimbursement contracts 
with insurance companies. The DEA optimization model that we have built can serve both as an 
optimization model as well as a strategic tool for providers’ success, by aligning the incoming 
patient population with the possible financial incentives.   
 All the different reimbursement models in the research were analyzed using the 
publically available data from data from HCI3. As promised at the beginning of the research, our 
model has the ability not only to assess which reimbursement model works best for which DRG, 
but also capable of ranking in their order of efficiency. We have also analyzed different 
reimbursement models based on different groups of DRGs, namely procedural and medical 
inpatient. The results are different from when analyzed for each DRG and all the DRGs together.  
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One of the disadvantages of CCR-DEA optimization model is its poor resolution among 
DMUs. Optimization using PCA along with DEA provides better resolution between 
reimbursement models that seem to have similar relative efficiencies, which can help in quick 
decision making. From our literature survey and to the best of our knowledge, PCA has not been 
used before in conjunction with DEA in healthcare settings. 
Our results show DEA can be serve as a negotiation tool in healthcare negotiations. DEA 
when combined with PCA has more power to discriminate among different DMUs, as seen in 
Figure 4.8, which can help hospitals to choose from various closely efficient reimbursement 
models. Based on the results from our optimization model, the DRGs that are more profitable or 
more efficient or have more number of patients being treated, the providers can decide about 
their future investment.  Figure 3.7 explains stepwise procedure to apply DEA-DMAIC roadmap 
as an add tool to negotiate reimbursement plans in healthcare systems. 
The ability of our optimization model to analyze the efficiency of reimbursement models 
at so many levels gives it a potential to be a strategic tool that can help providers not only 
negotiate with different insurers but also provide competitive edge in the market.  
Our optimization model will not only help financial health of hospitals but also force 
them to provide quality service to the patients as mentioned in Obama care Act.   
For future research more DRGs could be included for overall optimization. DEA also has 
a potential to be used in clinical efficiency which affects the financial outcome of the hospitals. 
People behavior in different organization and how it affects their efficiency is another area of 
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future research. DEA combined when combined with other techniques like PCA, MCDM or 
MAUT can provide a robust tool for calculating efficiency in almost all the fields.  
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